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The Role of the G8 in the
New Millennium
JOHN J. KIRTON AND JOSEPH P. DANIELS

Introduction

During the 1990s, the Group of Seven (G7) and now Group of Eight (G8),
has attracted a rising crescendo of scholarly and policy criticism as it and
the world have confronted a host of new issues and major transformations.
The criticisms have centered on the apparent failure of the G 7/8 to manage
its core economic and financia! agenda, to assist Russia in its democratic
market transition and integration into the global economy, and to address
the new transnational issues and pressures toward regionalism in the world.
To many, these charges have acquired added force as the Asían financia!
crisis moves beyond its regional origins to create econom ic damage and
instability everywhere. Further erosion in the credibility of the summit
process will no doubt occur as Russia sits precariously on the verge of
fmancial and even political collapse, as Europe reinforces its regional identity and strategy with the advent of the Euro, and as North America considers building on regional solutions through the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in response (Bergsten, 1998; Malmgren, 1998;
Hale, 1998).
Amidst such prevailing pessimism and uncertainty, this collection
offers a more firmly grounded and optimistic assessment ofthe outlook for
global govemance as the transformed world ofthe new millennium rapidly approaches. It looks beyond the current criticism to examine the underlying transformations now underway in the G8 as an institution and in the
world that its seeks to govern. It provides a critical, scholarly assessment
of the G8's performance and prospects in addressing the issues that have
moved from the domestic stage to the centre of the international agenda as
the post cold war world of globalization and deepening integration gives
way to the fully global system ofthe new millennium.
The collection explores the logic of the contemporary critics to
offer improved explanations ofthe circumstances under which the G7/G8
3

4 The G8's Role in the New Millennium

is effective in addressing both its traditional subjects and the defining issues
of the emerging era - the sound management of the global financia] system
in both its govemmental and prívate sector dimensions, employment and
employability, foreign direct investment and its link with social values, and
transnational financia] crime and drugs. In all cases, its analysis is policy
oriented and forward looking, both in anticipating the emerging G8 agenda
in these areas, and pointing to what action the G8 will, can or should take to
contribute to global governance in these realms.

The Approach
To meet these objectives this collection builds on, refines and reaches
beyond the majar existing competing theories ofG7/8 performance outlined
in Table 1.1 - the seminal "American leadership" model of Putnam and
Bayne, the "concert governance" model of Kirton and Wallace, the "false
new consensus" model ofBergsten and Henning, and the recent "democratic institutional" model oflkenberry and Kokotsis (Putnam and Bayne, 1987;
Kirton, 1989; Kirton, 1993; Wallace, 1984; Bergsten and Henning, 1996;
Ikenberry, 1993 ; Kokotsis and Kirton, 1997; Kokotsis, 1998).
The objective is to generate new data and insights that will contribute to the development of general theories of international cooperation in
política] economy, enrich institutional analysis in economics, and provide a
foundation to assess and advance proposals for G7/G8 reformas it addresses the issues likely to domínate in the new millennium.
To assess the contemporary relevance of such explanations, this collection goes well beyond the particular issues that have historically highlighted the G7 agenda. Rather, it explores the enduring central functions of
the G7 /8 as an institution of global governance (notably in co-operation,
compliance and crisis management) in the context ofthe issues and processes that, now and in the future, will domínate a radically transforming world.
Here it draws on and extends the leading theories of G7/8 and intemational
co-operation to identify the factors and their interrelationships that are relevant to the G7 /8's performance in the new era of proliferating globalization.
To conduct such a far reaching, fundamental and forward-looking
analysis, this work employs a multidisciplinary and multidimensional
approach. It mobilizes the perspectives of política] science, economics,
management studies and law. It presents analyses from leading experts of
the G7 and its core issues who are based in Europe, North America and
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Table 1.1

Models of G7/8 Cooperation and Compliance

ModelA: American Leadership (Putnam and Bayne, 1984, 1987)
l. U.S. assertion of "strong leadership in alignment ... with at least one other
major power", (subjective hegemony) as necessary but not sufficient condition;
2 . " Reign ing ideas and the salient historical lessons as interpreted by leaders in
each era" (policy ideas and spasmodic learning favouring a recognition of
shared interests, in response to dramatic evidence of policy failure) ;
3. The absence of electoral uncertainties and presence of domestic cleavages and
alignments in key countries allowing "a mutually supportive transnational
alliance" (domestic politics).
Model B: Concert Governance (Wallace, 1984; Kirton , 1989)
l. Predominant Capabilities - collectively dominant and internally equal capabili ti es ;
2. Constricted Participation among only and all major powers ;
3. Common Principies of major power responsibility, market democracy, and rule
of law ;
4 . Political Control by popularly elected leaders;
5 . Crisis Pooling - interdependence and intervulnerability activated by crisis,
especially a "second shock".
Model C: False New Consensus (Bergsten and Henning, 1996)
Decline during the 1990s due to:

l. False New Consensus - "a growing consensus within the group that changes in
global economic conditions make it impossible for them to pursue" previously
feasible initiatives;
2. American decline - "the decline in America's economic and security clout,
which partly stems from the end of the Cold War and with America's inconsistent policies and inept performance" ;
3. Traditional differences among the members, particularly the U . S. and
Germany, on several key issues.
Model D: De m ocratic Institutionalism (lkenberry, 1993; Kokotsis , 1998)
l . Linked Domestic and International Institutions - powerful domestic departments with defined G7 responsibilities and powerful international institutions
which G7 members control;
2. G7 Institutionalization- established G7/8 ministerial and official forums and
an institutionalized summit preparatory and follow -up process ;
3. Multilateral Regime Nests ;
4 . Leader Commitment - direct involvement by leaders who give priority to the
multilateral co-operation, G7 institutions and its particular issues ;
5. Popular Support - high domestic approval for leaders and supportive public
opinion for the G7/G8 issue.
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Japan and who in many cases have had extensive experience in severa}
regions. 1t provides the views of scholars whose rigorous academic analyses are infused by the insights gained from present and past involvement in
often senior reaches of the policy world. It avoids imposing any single
model or methodological perspective to allow each contributor to explore
with full freedom how a rapidly changing G7 /8 system is addressing the
demands that domínate the new world of the coming millennium.

The New World and its Challenges
The rapidly approaching new millennium marks not only a convenient
chronological divide to assess the pace of the changes to the world economy and political system brought about at the outset of the 1990s by the end
of the cold war, and the resulting processes of globalization throughout
newly opened democratic polities and market economies. Rather it is also
the opening of a new era of majar transformation in the capabilities and foreign policy approaches of the world's majar powers, the processes which
underlie these changes, the agenda created by them, and the way intemational institutions such as the G7 /8 adapt to exercise global govemance in
response.
The signs of this emergent new system are first evident in the
unprecedented and often puzzling changes that arise when the contemporary
world is viewed through the traditional state-centric prism of international
politics and the management of the international economy. The United
States appears, for the first time since the late 1940s, to be enjoying a new
across-the board hegemonic dominance, one more deep and enduring than
the shallow, short-lived Reagan revival of the early 1980s, but one without
the outward looking internationalism of America's initial hegemonic
moment (Mulford, 1998). This new America represents a profound challenge to a G 7/8 initially created in 197 5 in response to American weakness,
as a forum where the domestic policy approaches of all members could be
shared as val id models, and the domestic resources of all pooled to provide
the global public goods America could no longer afford to give alone.
A once vibrant and steadily growing Japan has now endured clase
to a decade of stagnation and is entering a recession and crisis of confidence
that threatens to go well beyond the temporary and limited reversal of the
1973 Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil shock that
beset it immediately prior to its entry, as a founding member, into the G7.
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Germany, France and Italy, with the advent of the Euro, are moving into an
unprecedentedly deep stage and form of regional integration, while Britain
and Canada confront the cruel choice of whether to embrace such regionalism or continue as countries with an autonomous global approach in which
the institutions of the G7 /8 occupy pride of place. And Russia, admitted as
a full member to the new G8 that was created alongside the continuing 07
at Birmingham in May 1998, is no longer the threatening cold war power of
old nor the stable market democracy that 08 assistance and engagement
were creating during the 1990s. Rather, it is rather a precarious power of
enormous potential on the verge of a collapse which threatens the global system and the capacity ofthe 07/8 to cope.
Such dramatic shifts in relative capability and foreign policy orientation are in large part the result of powerful new processes now at work in
the world. The proliferating speed, breadth and depth of international action
by civil society actors and individuals are currently creating a new fully
global system that demands continuous, comprehensive, effective global
governance in response. The speed and accessibility of information and
communication is evident in global financial markets, which countries wishing to preserve stable currencies or peculiar, opaque national financia! systems can no longer easily resist.
With a few exceptions, most regions are now part ofthis single integrated global system, as the opening that carne with the democratic-market
revolution of the 1990s has now been reinforced by an often painful internationally-engaged re-orientation in foreign policy anda wrenching reform
of domestic institutions and practices in support. Partly as a result, subjects
long dealt with essentially or entirely as an essential part of domestic politics, and considered to be part of the hard core of a nation's sovereign prerogatives - the supervision of national banks and financia} institutions,
employment and employability programs for citizens, regulating direct
investment and combatting crime - have now been elevated to the international leve] as the central agenda.
These transformations are giving the institutions of global governance, beginning with the 07/8, a new agenda, and forcing fast-paced
processes of reform in an effort to cope. Thus financia! supervision since
the Halifax Summit of 1995, employment as a microeconomic focus since
the Detroit ministerial of 1994 and crime since the Ottawa ministerial meeting of 1995 and the Lyon Summit of 1996 have become the centre of 07
concern. To address such issues, for example, transnational crime, it has
been necessary to involve other countries and include Russia as a new mem-
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ber. A proliferating array of ministerial forums for a vast array of subjects
have left leaders free to deal in depth with immediate crises and longer term
priorities. The new Birmingham model for conducting the annual G7 /G8
Summit, introduced by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in May 1998 and
destined to be repeated by the German Chancellor as host of the 1999
Summit in June at Cologne, represents the most recent major attempt to
make the G7/8 an effective centre of global governance for this new world.

The Analyses
To explore how these new critica} global issues are being managed, the role
ofthe reformed G7/G8 in this regard, and the potential ofthe G7/G8 as the
effective centre of global governance in the transformed world of the new
millennium, it is necessary to examine in turn when and why the G7/G8 performs as an effective intemational institution, how it is addressing its core
task of managing the global financia} and economic system, and how well it
is coping with the newly globalized priorities of investment, employment
and crime.
Thus Part 1 provides an overview of the recent performance of the
G7 /8 in fostering policy cooperation and coordination, compliance with collective commitments, and crisis management. It offers refined versions of
the classic models of G7 /8 performance and applies them to the contemporary G8 agenda and the new forces at work as the millennium approaches.
It features three chapters written by the majar theorists of G7 behaviour and
a fourth chapter offering a critique of the argument that the G8 is becoming
or should become a centre of global govemance.
This examination begins, in Chapter 2, with Sir Nicholas Bayne's
exploration of "Continuity and Leadership in an Age of Globalization".
Here, the leading sc·holarly and practitioner analyst of the G7 points to the
need for the G7 /8 to deal persistently with the world's core problems, to
expand its institutional capacity to this end and to focus on its unique advantages as an international institution. Contrary to initial hopes and claims,
Bayne argues, the summits have not been good at forecasting trends (though
they are good at crisis management), nor in choosing successful policies first
time round. But, to their credit, they keep retuming to issues until they get
them right. The focus at Birm ingham on what are "the Four Horsemen of
Globalization" - job loss, crime, financia} panic and world poverty - is not
new, as all four themes have recurred in various forms during the summit's
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history. To make an impact, the summits need to establish continuity; and
that requirement is expanding the G7/G8 apparatus and making the summits
themselves less distinct from other international methods.
In Chapter 3, on "Explaining G8 Effectiveness", John Kirton offers
a more optimistic assessment ofthe G7's performance and potential, but one
that points in the same direction toward the institutional adaptations required
for the new millennium. Kirton argues that as the post cold war globalizing
world ofthe 1990s moves into the new millennium, the G7 and new G8 are
emerging asan effective centre, and are prospectively the effective centre of
global governance.
During the 1990s the institution has enjoyed an enduring and
enlarging success in forwarding, against formidable resistance, the new core
values of inclusive democracy, ecologically sustainable market economies,
and intemational openness and engagement. Its recent success and future
potential rests on four foundations: the growing systemic predominance of
capability and equality of capability within the G8; increasingly deep interdependence and intervulnerability among G8 members; a common commitment to the core values of market democracy, sustainable development,
social equity and human rights; and the G8's unique operation by popularly
and democratically elected leaders free of bureaucratic constraint.
In Chapter 4, on "The G8 and the New Political Economy", Michael
Hodges offers a far more skeptical analysis. He suggests the capacity of the
G7/8 to fulfill the hopes invested in it is limited. Its current membership
makes little sen se in the 21st century, after the Euro, expansion of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the proliferation of other regional and multilateral organizations. If Russia is included, should not China also be a
member? It would make more sense to return to fireside chats for the US,
Japan, the European Union (EU) Presidency and Commission, perhaps the
European Central Bank (ECB) and leave concrete tasks to other, broader
organizations. In that way the world could reap the unique advantage ofthe
G7 as a deliberative, catalytic and direction setting forum, while leaving
decision-making and implementation to other institutions with the multilateral membership and organizational capacity required.
The actual record of the G7 in collective decisionmaking and
implementation is the focus of Chapter 5, where Ella Kokotsis and Joseph
Daniels take a clase look at "G8 Summits and Compliance". They note that
since the inception of the summit, there has been little effort to analyze and
explain compliance with summit commitments as a foundation for identifying proposals to improve the summit's compliance record. They report the
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results of the existing data on compliance with G7 commitments, identify
the factors that create higher compliance in certain issue areas, and offer
suggestions for improving the compliance record of the G7/G8 member
states with their summit commitments.
Part II of this volume turns to the courses, causes, and challenges of
contemporary G7/8 performance and its potential in regard to the core
financia! issues bred by intensified globalization. These include classic
macroeconomic management, now centered in the reform of the Japanese
economy, challenges to the international financia] system in the light of the
recent Asian-initiated crisis, the process of constructing a new international
financia] architecture, and the means to promote growth and monetary stability in the world economy.
In Chapter 6, on "Japan's Summit Contributions and Economic
Challenges", Koji Watanabe argues that for Japan, the annual G7 summit now G8 - has been, and still is, among the most important international
forums for Japanese politics, not just diplomatically, but also for domestic
politics. However, macroeconomic policy coordination - one of the key
themes since the summit's inception - has had its limits in preventing the
Japanese economy from moving from boom to bust in the late 80s and early
90s. One ofthe reasons might be that summit coordination has tended to be
centered on externa] balance issues. The crucial issue for Japan now is how
to deal with the trade-off between econom ic recovery and structural reform
- an issue that the Japanese government failed to adequately handle in 199697.
In Chapter 7, "Supervising the International Financia] System",
Joseph Daniels examines the evolution and globalization of domestic financia] systems. The problems and risks inherent in the system are discussed
and the recent calls for global supervision and regulation considered.
Daniels argues that the G8 and G7 have enjoyed limited successes and, more
often than not, have failed to provide an effective leadership role in this
issue area. Further, Daniels claims that existing institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Bank for
Intemational Settlements (BIS), and the Group of Ten (G 1O) lack the
resources and ability to resolve or mitigate inevitable financia! crises.
In Chapter 8, "Promoting Growth in the World Economy", Bronwyn
Curtís examines the forces that have forced changes in the economies ofthe
United States and the United Kingdom, and will force changes in the
economies of continental Europe. She argues that competition, globalization, and monetary unification will force changes that otherwise would be
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politically unpalatable. Particularly in Europe, the constraints imposed by
monetary unification and the forces of de-industrialization will bring about
structural change in all the various sectors of the European economies.
In Chapter 9, on "Managing the Global Economy", Charles
Goodhart discusses the opportunities for reform and policy action in light of
the recent East Asían financial crises. Goodhart argues that rigidly fixed
exchange rate regimes have proved too fragile for the developing and
emerging economies and that financia) reform would be needed before
adopting a currency board arrangement. Goodhart also argues that financia)
reform is needed before full capital account liberalization can take place.
Additionally he examines the IMF response to the recent crises, which, as
he argues, was slow and perhaps inappropriate given the nature of the crises.
Goodhart concludes with an interesting perspective on the winners and losers in the crises.
Part III ofthis volume moves from the financia) core ofthe G7 and
global agenda to deal with a broader array of priority issues. It explores how
the G8 has coped with the new, once largely domestic or bilateral issues,
which intensifying processes of deepening integration have now placed
prominently on the international agenda. These include cases, notably
investment, where the G 7 has long been active but where its recent performance appears to many to be wanting. It also includes newer cases of
G7/8 emphasis, such as employment and crime, where productive G7 action
is more in evidence.
In Chapter 1O, on "Negotiating Multilateral Rules to Promote
Investment", Alan Rugman takes up a central issue in a world of deepening
integration, in which foreign direct investment is increasing far faster than
international trade and in which govemments are struggling to create a global regime of rules to govern such investment, from their regional foundations in North America's NAFTA, Europe's European Union, and Asia's
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Rugman argues that an
important topic for the G8 should be how to rescue the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAl) from imminent failure . The design and
adoption of a clear set of multilateral investment rules should be a priority
for the G8 leaders. After exploring the reasons for the political failure ofthe
MAl despite its economic benefits, the Canadian experience with the MAl
is used to illustrate the negative side of non-govemmental organizations
(NGOs) in the MAl process.
In Chapter 11, on "Designing Effective Policies for Employment
Creation", Richard Layard argues that the key to conquering unemployment

12 The GB's Role in the New Millennium

is to make individuals more employable- improving their appeal to employers and letting their wages adjust to reflect productivity. Problems of
employment will not be solved through artificial rationing of work, nor
through exposing workers to unrestricted "hire and fire" practices. Progress
lies along a middle way between the unregulated labour markets of North
America and the overprotected system in Europe.
In Chapter 12, on "Combating Transnational Financia) Crime"
George Staple takes a clase look at how the proliferating problem of financia} crime is countered by the existing international legal regime and by the
government ofthe world's largest financia} centre, Britain . He highlights the
mismatch in a world where money can flow freely on an illegal as well as
legal basis, but where the criminal law and capacity to combat it remain
nationally based and supported only by very limited intemational cooperation. In the face of large scale international fraud, the British Government
has moved to institute new protective measures nationally, within the
European Union, and through the G8 . Yet, while Britain offers enhanced
assistance to foreign governments conducting international investigations
and trials in Britain, there is a need for new international action to facilitate
these processes and the assistance Britain needs from foreign govemments
when pursuing criminals abroad. Moreover, despite G8 action beginning in
1988 and the May 1998 G8 decision to expand the Financia} Action Task
Force (FATF), there are further measures needed to counter the burgeoning
transnational crime of money laundering. Notwithstanding impressive
national and European initiatives, Staple concludes, much more could be
done, through G8 leadership, at the international level.

Conclusions
As is evident from these chapters, this volume offers a vibrant and diverse
array of views about the proper role of the G7 /8, the causes of past success,
the adequacy of its current reforms, the management of pressing issues, and
prescriptions for future action and institutional adjustment. This richness in
analysis reflects the initial conviction that understanding the world of the new
millennium and the G7/8's role in goveming it would be best secured not by
imposing a single perspective but by allowing for an open ended and farreaching probe into past performance and a largely unknown emerging
future. Thus these analyses began united only in the conviction that the
world of the new millennium could well be different in several important
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respects from even the recent past and that the G7/8 was worthy of more
intense and critica! scrutiny as an institution that could have an substantial
role in goveming it. Yet beyond these initial premises, and amidst the rich
diversity of analysis, argument and advocacy, sorne common themes emerge.

Current Performance
There is a widespread view that the G7 /8 has exhibited a widely varying
performance over time and across issue areas - that it has been and can be
effective, even though its actual performance of late has often been highly disappointing. The most optimistic assessment comes from John
Kirton, who argues that the decade of the 1990s has seen the G 7/8 retum
to the high performanc.e of its early years, and that its consistently strong
record means it is poised to emerge as the centre of global govemance in
the new millennium . A shared if more saber view comes from Kokotsis
and Daniels who see the summit making ambitious specific commitments
that are complied with in the environment, development and even econom ic fields. lt is thus worth having as a governance mechanism in the
international community. Bayne too sees the summit as effective, if not on
its first encounter with an issue but eventually as it perseveres to get matters right.
Many others see the G7 as being effective on specific issues at particular times. For Bayne it is in the management of acute crises that the
summit excels. For Watanabe it is picking up new issues atan early stage,
and in dealing with the Russian issue. Daniels sees the summit taking severa] well placed initiatives and actions in response to financia} risks. For
Staple, the G8 decision to expand the FATF to prompt anti-money laundering bodies to be established in broader areas of the world is a commendable step forward.
Yet these occasional successes are matched by a similar number of
failures. Bayne asserts that the summit is no better than anyone else in
forecasting crises. Watanabe suggests the G7 failed to warn of the possibility of a bust when Japan was basking in asset inflation. And for
Daniels, by not handling effectively the present financia} crisis, the G8 has
demonstrated that it is not an institution of effective global leadership in
the area of deepest importance.
Daniels' charge also points to the view that the G7 /8 has been an
overall failure. Indeed, Daniels concludes that the G7, the G8, and the
summit process has not dealt effectively with the most pressing economic
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issue of 1998 - the fast-developing liquidity crisis of domestic financia}
sectors. The most pessimistic assessment comes from Hodges, who argues
that repeated G7 failures, for example in multilateral trade liberalization,
demonstrate that is not at all capable as serving as a centre of global governance.

Proper Role
In part these varying assessments ofthe G7/8's performance reflect different
conceptions ofthe proper role the G7/8 does and should play in the global
community. The most limited conception of its appropriate functions comes
from Michael Hodges. He sees its utility as a club through which leaders of
major powers bond with each other, raise consciousness about new issues,
set an agenda, spin off initiatives, create networks, prod other institutions to
do things, and assist in creating institutions that are suited to a particular
task.
Others add additional or more specific functions. Bayne implies
that it should also, despite past failures, anticípate and act to prevent crises
before they become acute. For Daniels, it has a unique role in the reform of
intemational financia} institutions, particularly in bailouts of future financial
crises, responsible IMF govemance, review of the very need for the IMF and
World Bank, and the design of approaches to supervisory coordination.
Rugman adds the task of designing and adopting a clear set of multilateral
investment rules. Layard feels employment is suitable for the G8 as a central theme. Staple asserts the G8 should provide leadership in securing international cooperation on transnational crime.

Causes of Success and Failure
These varying conceptions of the G7/8's performance and proper role
depend on, and point to, different factors that generate success. Here, the
major theorists of summit success offer enhanced versions of their familiar
theories, while the other authors offer important additions.
Among the traditional theorists, Bayne goes beyond the classic
Putnam-Bayne emphasis on American leadership, lessons of the past and
domestic coalition support to stress the role of sustained and interactive
treatment of recurrent problems. Kirton affirms the importance of concerted power, constricted participation, common principies, and political control
by popularly elected leaders (see also Hormats, 1998). But he modifies his
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former concert equality model by now pointing to constricted participation
that allows for the association of outsiders, intensifying interdependence
activated by crisis, common problems as well as principies, and multi-level
political control involving ministers as well as leaders. Kokotsis and
Daniels continue to emphasize institutional variables at the national and
international level and, along with Kirton, política] control, but now give
greater prominence to the expansion of both the preparatory and follow-up
phases of the summits.
Among the other authors, Koji Watanabe argues that an effective
multilateral surveillance system that allows members to share sufficient
knowledge ofthe political as well as economic dynamics ofthe country concerned is a requisite for effective G7 macroeconomic policy coordination.
Also important is a necessary focus on economic policy issues that are more
relevant to external balances, and the psychology of popular and market
optimism and pessimism that can render the effect of political messages
emanating from the summit perverse. Daniels sees failure arising when the
G7 delegates to international organizations, such as the IMF, that are illequipped to deal with particular issues. Hodges too stresses the centrality of
international organizational capacity, with the assured budgets, secretariats,
permanent employees, continuous informal interactions, and well-tailored
expertise they contain.

Proposals for Reform
These assessments of performance, proper roles, and causes of success and
failure underlie and inspire various suggestions for G7 /8 reform. Together
the list of proposed reforms offered by the authors covers the full array of
traditional dimensions, from membership and agenda to the degree and form
of institutionalization (Merlini, 1994 ). Yet they al so raise new issues - such
as the engagement of civil society and the use of new technologies. They
also show that the innovations of the Birmingham models are largely
endorsed, but not fully embraced. The debate on G7 /8 reform is thus sure
to continue.
On the perennial question of membership, Hodges proposes that
outside guests be invited on an ad hoc basis, in order to alleviate the sense
of exclusion and enhance the legitimacy of the G7 /8. He further suggests
that the G8 create a formalized link with China, given the latter's growing
importance to the world economy.
The question of the appropriate G7 /8 agenda is the subject of dif-
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fering views. Hodges propases a focus on special themes and topics, as at
Binningham in 1998, but wams of the dangers of concentrating on too little. Kokotsis and Daniels, with a view to improving members' compliance
with 07/8 commitments, present several specific suggestions about the
agenda. They agree with Hodges on the need for less overload and greater
focus on issues where the 07 can make a difference - on domestic policy
issues where synergy with their internationalized equivalents can be
achieved; where means-ends relationships are well understood and accepted; where leaders exercise real as well as formal authority; and where adequate domestic institutions exist for im p lementation.
There is also a lively debate on the institutionalization of the summit. Bayne, once cautious, now approves the extension of the lower-level
G8 apparatus, in ways that make it easier for leaders to delegate. Kokotsis
and Daniels, raising doubts about Birmingham's innovative leaders-only format, note that compliance is more likely to come ifthe ministers are in attendance on site. Hodges favours informality, suggesting the summit process,
as at Binningham, should let leaders retreat to an isolated country home to
discuss what they want by themselves. Ooodhart raises the issue of institutionalization and automaticity at the domestic level, wondering if members
would be prepared to put in their bond covenants clauses that would automatically convert fixed interest rates into equity when financia} crisis looms.
Bayne raises two newer issues of summit refonn. He argues that the
08 should mobilize its democratic legitimacy by looking beyond government, particularly by forging better links to the prívate business community.
He further propases that the G7 /8 make better use of Internet-related technology to argue for the benefits of globalization and respond to the anxieties
about it that the public in member countries have.
Despite these differences, none of the authors takes issue with the
basic presumption that the new millennium will bring not justa new century in a chronological sense but also, and far more importantly, a transformed
real world. And despite often severe criticisms of the 07 /8's recent performance and current configuration, none suggest that it should retreat from
the challenge of providing leadership in managing the transition into this
new world. In that particular sense, all concur that the G7 /8 can become an
effective center of global governance as the new millennium dawns.
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